18 October 2004, Reviewed July 21, 2009
"The California mortgage brokers association has recently come out with
a definition of ‘predatory lending’, which they claim will allow
borrowers to protect themselves. Do you agree?"
I think they get an A for effort, and are on the right track in equating
predatory lending with price-gouging. However, the execution is a bit
muddled. Here is their definition.
"Predatory lending is defined as intentionally placing consumers in loan
products with significantly worse terms and/or higher costs than loans
offered to similarly qualified consumers in the region for the primary
purpose of enriching the originator and with little or no regard for the
costs to the consumer."
The Standard
According to this definition, a loan is predatory if the
terms are unfavorable relative to other loans "offered to similarly
qualified borrowers". But this is incomplete. The other loans to which
the subject loan is compared must be identical with regard not only to
borrower qualifications, but also with regard to the type of property,
the purpose of the loan, the type of loan, and the timing of the loan.
How mortgage brokers could overlook these things that they understand so
well is hard to fathom.
Subjectivity
A useful definition of predatory lending can’t be
dependent on what goes on in the mind of the loan originator (LO), yet
that is the case in the CAMB definition. Notice the word
"intentionally". It means that if the LO charged 7% to a borrower who
could have borrowed at 5%, but the LO didn’t know that, his actions
weren’t predatory.
Not only is the knowledge of the LO relevant, but also his intentions,
which must be to enrich himself. If he charged 7% to a borrower who
could have borrowed at 5% but the LO planned to donate his fee to the
poor, his actions are not predatory.
My Revision
Both these problems can be fixed, as per my revised
definition below:
"Predatory lending is defined as placing a consumer in a loan at more
onerous terms, including rate, points, other fees and other important
provisions such as prepayment penalties, than that consumer could have
obtained shopping other sources for the same loan at the same time."
I believe this retains the spirit of the CAMB definition, while it
removes ambiguity concerning the standard. It also eliminates LO
subjectivity, which should not be part of the definition. My version
also has a clear and useful implication that is obscured in the CAMB
version: predatory lending exists only because borrowers won’t shop or
can’t shop effectively. Public policy would be more effective if it were
focused more directly on that problem.
Another Type of Predatory Lending
My definition is incomplete, however. There is another type of LO
behavior that also deserves to be called "predatory".
Predatory lending also involves persuading a borrower to refinance a
loan that the borrower would have declined to do had she been fully
aware of all the implications and consequences of the deal.
Refinance deals can be very complicated, as two loans are involved, and
sometimes three or four. The LO often focuses the borrower’s attention
on the immediate impact of the deal on mortgage payments, ignoring the
impact on loan balances, and possible future increases in payments.
Borrowers are left to discover these for themselves, and the discovery
may come too late.
From the standpoint of public policy, this is a more difficult problem
to deal with than price-gouging because no one can say with certainty
that a refinance deal is not in a borrower’s interest – except the
borrower. The right granted to borrowers to rescind the deal without
cost within 3 days of closing is an appropriate remedy, and probably the
only one that makes sense.
But the right of rescission only works for borrowers who use the 3 days
to take a hard look at their deal, which very few do. Jeff Jaye, an
Upfront Mortgage Broker in California, tells me that over 15 years and
about 3,000 transactions, he has had 3 rescissions, each one of which he
remembers vividly. In one, the married couple hit a slot machine jackpot
for $250,000; in the second, the husband died suddenly; and in the third
the couple decided to divorce! Not a single rescission arose from a
reconsideration of the costs and benefits of the transaction.
Perhaps more borrowers would reconsider if they better understood what
they should be looking for. Read
Rescinding a Mortgage Refinance.